Prism door to see the inevitable trend of domestic server

The prism door gave us an information security lesson. Our Chinese people's thinking always stresses that "people don't make me, I don't make anyone," and think that if you do it right, there is nothing you can worry about. But the reality is the opposite, you do not make others, others always want to make you! Prism door exposure showed that the U.S. National Security Agency also attacked the backbone networks of Beijing Tsinghua University, China Telecom and China Unicom, and other communications networks.

It is reported that the United States’ modern intelligence work is more dependent on technical means, 70% of the U.S. intelligence is obtained through technical means, and Bond-type manual work accounts for less and less. The network intrusion method is generally divided into two aspects: hardware and software, and first hard and soft, hardware intrusion as the main means. Because the software's backdoors and vulnerabilities may fail due to system hardening and changes, the hardware's backdoor quickly becomes effective once it is started. For example, when the United States invaded Iran’s nuclear facilities, it was the United States that implanted hardware viruses on Siemens’ control cards, scrapped control systems and state-of-the-art equipment throughout Iran and facilities, and let Iran’s nuclear program retreat for more than a year.

In fact, the prevention of cybersecurity in various countries is also initiated by hardware. For example, the “Australia Financial Review” disclosed that intelligence agencies in the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States have internally banned the use of Lenovo PCs because some lab tests at that time showed that in Lenovo’s PC Some chips may have remote control vulnerabilities. Because the networks of the five intelligence agencies in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States are already interconnected, Canada, New Zealand, etc. may all have received this ban. According to sources in the intelligence department, this ban was released as early as mid-2000, so it can be speculated that these problematic chips were not produced by Lenovo but provided by domestic companies.

In fact, it is not a personal computer that poses a greater threat to network security. It is a large number of communication and switching devices in the network, such as servers and switches. Our country can see the security barriers encountered by Huawei and ZTE’s North American markets for the production of large-scale networks and communication exchange equipment. But in fact, this kind of speculation and suspicion is also unfounded. The world’s leading companies for network switching equipment are American companies such as Cisco, F5, and Motorola. Huawei and ZTE’s market share are still relatively small, and they do not dare to take risks. Greatly free to join the control chip. Such restrictions can only be regarded as a double standard in the high-tech trade of Western countries that claim to be free markets. Information security is only an excuse to block Chinese companies from entering their markets.

Faced with the various security excuse of Western countries, we can learn from the facts on the one hand, and on the other hand, we can also treat people in their own ways. For example, since Prism Doors has reported that companies such as Cisco, Microsoft, and Google have cooperated with the U.S. Security Agency to detect information through their devices, software, or applications at all times, why are our government departments and national key departments not taking measures to deprecate? What about these company products? For a simple example, the secretary of a country’s leader may consult Google Maps to plan the route of his leader’s travel. Once the secretary is spotted by US intelligence agencies, the leader’s itinerary will be fully exposed by Americans. Under it. Next, drones, guided weapons, sniper gunners, ... you know!

Another type of key device in network communications is the server. In the Chinese server market, more than 70% of the market share is occupied by foreign brands. From the perspective of national information security, the process of national production of server products should be accelerated. Because of the large amount of server products, their motherboard devices vary widely, especially some high-end servers all have remote start, remote maintenance hardware design, very easy to use by people with ulterior motives. A few years ago, Compaq Server exposed a "flying line door", that is, people found that an open line was soldered on the motherboard of a series of servers of Compaq, apparently short-circuiting certain functional areas, but the server could still be used normally. The problem is that ordinary engineers can't explain what the shielded circuit is for, and its manufacturer's explanation is not clear. Can you explain that it is a useless circuit, but is it possible that there is a circuit with special features or even spy functions?

Therefore, there is still much work China needs to do in terms of national information security. One of the most direct and effective measures is the localization of network equipment of governments and key departments, such as the localization of servers, switches, and routers. For example, as a leading server manufacturer in China, Powerleader has taken the lead in the "autonomous and controllable" path. It owns a series of nationally-developed Godson self-improving servers and is suitable for military, security, and other confidential departments; it has complete autonomy. The R & D-designed Baode PR4840R quad high-end fault-tolerant cloud server is suitable for key application servers of the government and core departments. Baode Institute of Technology revealed that it will soon release a 2U dual-circuit new product that is fully self-developed and designed. Although many core product technologies are still in the hands of foreign companies, with the efforts of many domestic companies, we are getting closer and closer to the ultimate goal of “self-controllability”.

The prism door is a mirror, reflecting the double standards of information security in developed countries, and it also shows the potential danger of information security in our country. The government should give more support to domestic brands from policy and practical application procurement, and promote the acceleration of China's IT industry to national production! The government, security and economic sectors should give priority to domestic brands in the procurement of network infrastructure equipment. It is gratifying to note that after the exposure of the Priment Gates, cyber security-related stocks have continued to be bullish, and the telecommunications sector has begun brewing the “De-Cevinization” process, which undoubtedly brings good news to the local Internet infrastructure providers.